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The Legality of California Development Fees
I. INTRODUCTION
Because California is such a desirable place to live, the state has
experienced a massive increase in population over the past half-cen-
tury.1 Paralleling this human expansion has been a growth in resi-
dential and commercial real estate development. As a result,
municipalities have been saddled with increased demands for public
facilities amd services. 2
Local government has traditionally provided for these needs, with
the costs being offset by revenue derived from property taxes as well
as state and federal government funds. However, when development
accelerated, municipalities were forced to seek other financing tech-
niques, such as increasing property taxes, declaring special assess-
ments, 3 :resorting to long-term debt-financing,4  and requiring
developers to dedicate land or pay in-lieu fees (exactions) as a prereq-
uisite to obtaining subdivision and building permits.5
Sources of revenue in California have narrowed considerably
within the last few years. The passage of Proposition 13 on June 6,
1978, which was incorporated into article XIIIA of the California
Constitution,6 limited the taxes that could be obtained from property
1. In 1940, approximately 6,950,000 people lived in California. In 1983, the esti-
mated population of California was 25,174,000. DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, STATE OF
CAL., CALIF)RNIA STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 13 (1984).
2. The increase of new residents and businesses in municipalities has caused local
governments to provide new streets, recreational facilities, schools, law enforcement
personnel and facilities, fire stations, and open space. 2 P. ROHAN, ZONING AND LAND
USE CONTROLS § 9.01[1] (1985).
3. Direct benefits supplied to particular properties were charged to landowners
or develope:cs through special assessments. 5 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA
LAW, Taxation § 5 (8th ed. Supp. 1984).
4. 2 P. ROHAN, supra note 2, § 9.01[1].
5. California has legislation authorizing municipalities to require dedication of
land or fees, in lieu of the dedications as a prerequisite for approval of subdivision
plans. See CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 66410-66499.58 (West 1983 & Supp. 1985).
6. Proposition 13 was incorporated into article XIIIA of the California Constitu-
tion in relevant part as follows:
Section 1. (a) The maximum amount of any ad valorem tax on real prop-
erty shall not exceed one percent (1%) of the full cash value of such property.
The one percent (1%) tax to be collected by the counties and apportioned ac-
cording to law to the districts within the counties.
(b) The limitation provided for in subdivision (a) shall not apply to ad
owners to 1% of the assessed valuation of the property. Since prop-
erty taxes had been the main source of funds for municipalities, their
revenues were sharply reduced.7
Under President Reagan's new federalism plan, which advocates
more power at the state level and thus less federal assistance, munici-
palities have not received as much federal assistance as they had pre-
viously received. California has been slow to approve measures to
provide funds for local needs. High interest rates have caused debt-
financing to become prohibitive. Because of the rapid increase in de-
velopment, the advent of Proposition 13, the reduction of federal and
state monies, and higher interest rates, municipalities are placing
more emphasis on obtaining dedications. In-lieu fees from developers
and the concept of "impact fees" have evolved to help pay for public
structures and services.8
valorem taxes or special assessments to pay the interest and redemption
charges on any indebtedness approved by the voters prior to the time this sec-
tion becomes effective.
Section 2. (a) The full cash value means the county assessor's valuation of
real property as shown on the 1975-76 tax bill under "full cash value" or,
thereafter, the appraised value of real property when purchased, newly con-
structed, or a change in ownership has occurred after the 1975 assessment.
All real property not already assessed up to the 1975-76 full cash value may be
reassessed to reflect that valuation ...
(b) The full cash value base may reflect from year to year the inflationary
rate not to exceed 2 percent for any given year or reduction as shown in the
consumer price index or comparable data for the area under taxing jurisdic-
tion . ..
Section 3. From and after the effective date of this article, any changes in
State taxes enacted for the purpose of increasing revenues collected pursuant
thereto whether by increased rates or changes in methods of computation
must be imposed by an Act passed by not less than two-thirds of all members
elected to each of the two houses of the Legislature, except that no new ad
valorem taxes on real property, or sales or transaction taxes on the sales of
real property may be imposed.
Section 4. Cities, counties and special districts, by a two-thirds vote of the
qualified electors of such district, may impose special taxes on such district,
except ad valorem taxes on real property or a transaction tax or sales tax on
the sale of real property within such City, County or special district.
Section 5. This article shall take effect for the tax year beginning on July 1
following the passage of this Amendment, except Section 3 which shall be-
come effective upon the passage of this article.
Section 6. If any section, part, clause, or phrase hereof is for any reason held
to be invalid or unconstitutional, the remaining sections shall not be affected
but will remain in full force and effect.
CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, §§ 1-6.
7. Although tax revenues to municipalities decreased, state funds were directed
to local governments to partially offset that decrease. A. RABUSHKA & P. RYAN, THE
TAx REVOLT 95 (1982).
8. Case, Implications of Proposition 13 on the Private Sector Economy, in RE-
SEARCH ON PROPOSITION 13 15-16 (J. Danziger ed. 1982). According to one writer, de-
velopment fees are an appropriate way to face the challenges of increased development
and a reduced tax base because they are "innovative methods of directing and financ-
ing local growth and development." Note, Development Fees: Standards to Determine
Their Reasonableness, 1982 UTAH L. REV. 549, 549. See also Johnston, Constitutional-
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This comment will trace the evolution of dedications, in-lieu fees,
and "impact fees" required of developers before their projects can be
initiated, examine how they are being challenged by developers, ex-
plain how they have been justified by California courts, incorporate
issues relating to the taxation feature of the exactions and impact
fees, and discuss the concerns relating to legal actions by developers
who feel that these fees are unfair or unconstitutional. It will also
discuss the course of legal proceedings resulting from these issues,
and examine the trends evolving from these legal proceedings.
Il. THE EVOLUTION OF DEDICATIONS, IN-LIEU FEES,
AND IMPACT FEES
New development forces local government to provide new public
structures and additional services.9 In the past, taxation of real prop-
erty provided municipalities with the most productive source of reve-
nue to fund these needs. Prior to the passage of Proposition 13 on
June 6, 1978, local governments received adequate percentages of the
real property value to cover these costs.' 0 Proposition 13 greatly di-
minished property taxes, and municipalities had to find alternative
sources of revenue.
Special assessments had also been used to finance public ifrastruc-
ture.11 These assessments were historically limited to money needed
for improvements which would directly benefit new developments.
Hence, when paying for special assessments, developers knew that
they would gain from the expenditure. However, California's intense
growth created the need for educational and recreational facilities, as
well as public facilities and services, and special assessments could
not legally cover such projects. Special assessments were designed to
finance direct benefits for the developers, and assessments to cover
educational and recreational facilities would only indirectly benefit
new developments.
New and more flexible financing techniques had to be established.
ity of Subdivision Control Exactions: The Quest for a Rationale, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 871,
873 (1967), in which the author believes the imposition of fees and dedications are the
answer to connecting increased capital costs of new development to the rapid "pace of
urbanization."
9. See Note, supra note 8, at 549-50.
10. Before Proposition 13, the tax rate was approximately 2.5% of the value of the
property. See A. RABuSHKA & P. RYAN, supra note 7, at 10-11.
11. D. HAGMAN & D. MISCZYNSKI, WINDFALLS FOR WIPEOUTs 311 (1978). Special
assessments were used to fund projects such as residential streets, sidewalks, curbs,
sewers, and storm drains. I&
The California Legislature took a giant step forward in adding the
Subdivision Map Act,12 following that with the enactment of the
School Facilities Act. i3 Pursuant to the Subdivision Map and School
Facilities Acts, municipalities could condition subdivision permits on
the requirement that developers either dedicate land to the munici-
pality or pay fees in lieu of dedications for projects such as school fa-
cilities,'4 parks,15 streets,16 and sewer facilities.17 Municipalities
could then acquire land immediately at prevailing costs, rather than
at a later time when costs would be higher.18 In-lieu fees applied to
those situations when it was impractical for dedications.
Another method of funding which evolved from dedications and in-
lieu fees is the impact fee. Impact fees have been defined as charges
levied by local governments against new development to generate
revenue for capital funding necessitated by that development.' 9 The
purpose of impact fees is therefore the same as the purpose of dedica-
tions and in-lieu fees. However, since the use of dedications and in-
lieu fees had been restricted by application of the Subdivision Map
Act and School Facilities Act, the range of impact fees that could be
required of developers broadened.20 Also, rezonings, zoning vari-
ances, special or conditional use permits, and building permits could
also be made conditional on payment of impact fees. 21
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO IMPACT FEES
Exactions and impact fees have been challenged by developers in
12. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 66410-66499.58 (West 1983 & Supp. 1986).
13. Id. § 65970-65981.
14. Id. § 65974 (city ordinance may require fees for interim classroom facilities
where overcrowding exists).
15. Id. § 66479 (local ordinance may require real property within the subdivision to
be reserved for parks, recreational facilities, fire stations, libraries, and other public
uses).
16. Id. § 66475 (local ordinance may require dedication of real property within the
subdivision for streets).
17. Id. § 66483 (local ordinance may require subdivider to provide for storm drains
and local sewer facilities).
18. D. HAGMAN & D. MISCZYNSKI, supra note 11, at 344.
19. Juergensmeyer & Blake, Impact Fees: An Answer to Local Governments' Cap-
ital Funding Dilemma, 9 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 415, 417 (1981). Note that impact fees are
different than in-lieu fees because in-lieu fees are based on dedication requirements,
while impact fees may extend beyond fees in lieu of dedications. Id. at 418-20.
20. Id.
21. D. HAGMAN & D. MISCZYNSKI, supra note 11, at 344. Impact fees can be ap-
plied to developments which are not land intensive, such as commercial developments
and apartment developments, because such developments also cause a burden to the
city. These types of developments sometimes escape the liabilities of dedications and
in-lieu fees since they are not covered by subdivision regulations under the Subdivision
Map Act. See also Associated Home Builders v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633,
484 P.2d 606, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630, appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 878 (1971) (plaintiff claimed
unfair treatment because developers who developed on single parcels in Walnut Creek
were not regulated by the Subdivision Map Act).
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California courts on numerous occasions based on constitutional priv-
ileges.2 2 The substance of these arguments has been that there is a
"taking" of property for the benefit of the community without just
compensation to the developer.
Taking claims are based on the fifth amendment of the United
States Constitution, which guarantees that private property will not
be taken for public use without payment of just compensation. 23 In
1977, the United States Supreme Court made a clear statement on
"taking" law in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City.24
In that case, the Court admitted that it could not fashion any set
formula to determine when justice and fairness require that eco-
nomic injuries caused by a public action be compensated. 25 Instead,
the court indicated that the merits of each case should be decided
upon its own factual circumstances. 26
In line with its ad hoc approach to the taking issues, the Court in
Penn Central set forth factors to determine if there was a taking. In
Penn Central, the New York Landmarks Preservation Commission
designated Grand Central Terminal in New York City a "landmark,"
and designated the block where it was located a landmark site. Penn
Central subsequently entered into a lease agreement with another
corporation which was to construct a multi-story office building
22. See Associated Home Builders v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 484 P.2d
606, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630, appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 878 (1971) (leading case involving due
process challenges). See also Ayres v. City Council of Los Angeles, 34 Cal. 2d 31, 207
P.2d 1 (1949); Grupe v. California Coastal Comm'n, 166 Cal. App. 3d 148, 212 Cal. Rptr.
578 (1985); Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. California Coastal Comm'n, 132 Cal. App. 3d 678,
183 Cal. Rptr. 395 (1982); Liberty v. California Coastal Comm'n, 113 Cal. App. 3d 491,
170 Cal. Rptr. 247 (1980); Selby Realty Co. v. City of San Buenaventura, 10 Cal. 3d 110,
514 P.2d 111, 109 Cal. Rptr. 799 (1973); Mid-Way Cabinet Fixture Mfg. v. County of San
Joaquin, 257 Cal. App. 2d 181, 65 Cal. Rptr. 37 (1967).
23. The fifth amendment provides in pertinent part: "No person shall be ... de-
prived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor shall private prop-
erty be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
Similarly, the California Constitution prohibits the state from taking private property
without the payment of just compensation. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 19. See also Rose,
Planning and Dealing: Piecemeal Land Controls as a Problem of Local Legitimacy, 71
CALIF. L. REV. 839, 901-02 (1983). "The root of a takings claim is that some public act
has placed on, an individual or group too high a proportion of some burden - a burden
which all (or at least some larger portion of the community) should bear." Id. (foot-
note omitted).
24. 438 U.S. 104 (1977).
25. Id at 124.
26. "[Wlhether a particular restriction will be rendered invalid by the govern-
ment's failure to pay for any losses proximately caused by it depends largely 'upon the
particular circumstances [in that] case.'" Id. (quoting United States v. Central Eureka
Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958)).
above the terminal. The commission denied plans for a fifty-three
story building and plans for a fifty-four story building. Penn Central
filed suit in state court, claiming that the denial to allow construction
violated the fifth and fourteenth amendments of the United States
Constitution because it amounted to a taking of property without just
compensation. The trial court's grant of relief was reversed by the
New York Court of Appeals with a finding that Penn Central's prop-
erty had not been taken.27
The Supreme Court set forth three factors to use in deciding if
there is a taking. First, the economic impact of the regulation on the
claimant, particularly the extent to which the regulation has inter-
fered with investment-backed expectations should be considered. 28
Second, the character of the governmental action is relevant. "A
'taking' may more readily be found when the interference with prop-
erty can be characterized as a physical invasion by government ...
than when interference arises from some public program adjusting
the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common
good."2 9 Finally, the Court recognized that "government actions that
may be characterized as acquisitions of resources to permit or facili-
tate uniquely public functions have often been held to constitute
'takings.' "30
Interestingly enough, California courts have not often addressed
the taking factors set forth in Penn Central when determining
whether an exaction or impact fee amounts to an incursion of the
fifth and fourteenth amendments requiring the payment of compen-
sation or invalidation of the action.31 Instead, California courts have
generally emphasized justifications in denying constitutional chal-
lenges. These include the voluntariness, privilege, benefit, and police
27. 438 U.S. at 119-22.
28. Id. at 124. Any finding of a taking must necessarily be based upon the claim
that the regulations result in a diminution of property value. However, most land use
regulations have "the inevitable effect of reducing the value of regulated properties."
Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 37 Cal. 3d 644, 686, 693 P.2d 261, 294, 209 Cal. Rptr. 682, 715
(1984). Even a significant diminution in value is insufficient to establish a confiscatory
taking. Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
29. 438 U.S. at 124 (citation omitted).
30. Id. at 128.
31. Grupe v. California Coastal Comm'n, 166 Cal. App. 3d 148, 212 Cal. Rptr. 578
(1985), is the only California case discovered by this author that has referred to Penn
Central in determining whether an exaction was a "taking." However, California
courts have generally emphasized the "economic impact" test of Penn Central in deter-
mining whether a zoning law amounts to a "taking." See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24
Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979), qffd, 447 U.S. 255 (1980); Furey v.
City of Sacramento, 24 Cal. 3d 862, 598 P.2d 844, 157 Cal. Rptr. 684, cert. denied, 444
U.S. 976 (1979). Although the Agins and Furey courts concentrated on issues relating
to whether a zoning law amounted to a taking, these cases are still relevant to exaction
and impact fee cases because they show the California Supreme Court's reliance on the
"economic impact" test in determining whether a "taking" has occurred. Grupe, 166
Cal. App. 3d at 175, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 595-96.
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power justifications. 32
The voluntariness justification is based on the fact that a developer
is not forced to develop within a particular city. If he does not like
the exaction and impact fee requirements of one municipality, he
does not have to build his project there. If he disagrees with the re-
quirements, yet adheres to them and goes ahead with his project,
then he is voluntarily paying the charges3 3 - the owner dedicates
land or -pays fees in return for the advantage of developing in that
location.
The city's granting of the privilege to build or subdivide entitles
that city to require payments or dedications to fund improvements
required by the new development. 34 One case has recognized that
the right to develop land is not a right at all but merely a privilege
granted to developers. Therefore, the city may require an exaction or
impact fee from the developer.35
Courts have granted significant support to the benefit justification
based on the fact that it is the developer who seeks to acquire the ad-
vantages of development.36 Associated Home Builders v. City of Wal-
nut Creek37 illustrates this position. In that case, the plaintiff
attempted to obtain approval of a subdivision. The court reasoned
that the land in question would be rendered more valuable by the
fact of subdividing. In return for this benefit, the city could require
plaintiff to dedicate a portion of his land or pay a fee.38 In addition to
the benefit to the developer, there is an increased burden on the
community. It is then only fair that the city should be able to share
in the windfall of the developer and apply the fee to costs incurred
32. Jolnston, supra note 8, at 876.
33. Id. at 877. One commentator claims that the voluntariness of a developer to
build in a particular city is strictly an economic analysis. Submission by the developer
indicates his belief that "the projected subdivision will be sufficiently profitable to ab-
sorb the (losses) .... " Id. at 881.
34. Juergensmeyer & Blake, supra note 19, at 427.
35. Trent Meredith, Inc. v. City of Oxnard, 114 Cal. App. 3d 317, 170 Cal. Rptr. 685
(1981). In that case, the right to develop was regarded as something the city could give
or withhold.. If the city chose to allow development, then the developer could be asked
to compensate the city through exactions or impact fees for granting the privilege.
The case is therefore a strong statement on the privilege theory in California.
36. See Associated Home Builders v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 484 P.2d
606, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630, appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 878 (1971); Ayres v. City Council of
Los Angeles, 34 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949).
37. 4 Cal. 3d 633, 484 P.2d 606, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630, appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 878
(1971).
38. 4 Cal. 3d at 644, 484 P.2d at 615, 94 Cal. Rptr. 639.
by the new development. 39
The most commonly used justification for exactions and impact
fees is police power. Police power is not defined or referred to in the
United States Constitution, but is implied as an attribute of state sov-
ereignty.40 The legislature of each state must use its own discretion
in exercising its right of police power.41 One of the most common
subjects of police power regulations is the area of land develop-
ment.42 Within the context of issues relating to dedications, in-lieu
fees, and impact fees, police power is defined "as the exercise of gov-
ernmental power to limit, regulate, or prohibit personal and business
activity and property uses without government compensation in or-
der to protect the public health, safety, morality, and general wel-
fare."43 The proper exercise of that power is not a deprivation of
property without due process of law.4 4
Limits on the use of police power are also not well-defined.
Berman v. Parker 45 is the leading United States Supreme Court case
which attempts to define the limitations of police power. According
to the majority opinion: "An attempt to define its reach or trace its
outer limits is fruitless, for each case must turn on its own facts. The
definition is essentially the product of legislative determinations ad-
dressed to the purposes of government, purposes neither abstractly
nor historically capable of complete definition."46
A California Supreme Court case has declared that police power is
"capable of expansion to meet existing conditions of modern life
.... "47 However, police power is not absolute.
The protection of private property in the Fifth Amendment presupposes that
it is wanted for public use, but provides that it shall not be taken for such use
without compensation . . . . When this seemingly absolute protection is
39. See 2 P. ROHAN, supra note 2, § 9.02.
40. Johnston, supra note 8, at 887.
41. Id. See also Trent Meredith, 114 Cal. App. 3d at 325, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 689 (po-
lice power held to be an inherent reserved power of the state, and it is within the
state's discretion to subject individual rights to reasonable regulations in the area of
land use and development).
42. Trent Meredith, 114 Cal. App. 3d at 325, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 689. See also 5 B.
WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAw, Constitutional Law § 444 (8th ed. 1974 &
Supp. 1984).
43. D. MCCARTHY, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAw IN A NUTSHELL 104 (1975).
44. See Selby Realty Co. v. City of San Buenaventura, 10 Cal. 3d 110, 119, 514 P.2d
111, 117, 109 Cal. Rptr. 799, 805 (1973) (holding that city may take property without
paying due compensation when it acts reasonably under its police power).
45. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
46. Id. at 32.
47. Miller v. Board of Public Works, 195 Cal. 477, 485, 234 P. 381, 383 (1925). See
also 16 AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 296 (1964), which states that local govern-
ments should not be put into a "straight jacket" by due process concerns, and that the
police power should be flexible to adapt to continuous changes in social and economic
conditions; Johnston, supra note 8, at 886 (police power is expansible to meet emerging
public needs).
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found to be qualified by the police power, the natural tendency of human na-
ture is to extend the qualification more and more until at last private property
disappears. But that cannot be accomplished in this way under the Constitu-
tion of the United States.
4 8
Police power can be delegated to political subdivisions of the
state.49 The authorization for municipalities to exercise exaction and
impact fee power is derived from certain California statutes and the
California Constitution. California statutes explicitly detail munici-
pal authority to obtain dedications and in-lieu fees in two sections.
The Subdivision Map Act 50 allows municipalities to require dedica-
tions and in-lieu fees from developers as conditions for final approval
of their subdivision maps. This act can be applied for many purposes,
including dedications of park lands,51 corridors for streets,52 sewer fa-
cilities for local or neighborhood areas, 53 and public access to natural
resources.54 The School Facilities Act authorizes dedications and in-
lieu fees for temporary school facilities.55
In general terms, the California Constitution confers broad powers
to the municipality. Article XI, section 7 authorizes each city and
county to "make and enforce within its limits all local ... ordinances
and regulations not in conflict with general laws."56 Article XI, sec-
tion 5 allows charters to provide that cities may "make and enforce
all ordinances and regulations in respect to municipal affairs, subject
only to restrictions and limitations provided in their several charters
and in respect to other matters they shall be subject to general
laws."57 These provisions may be used to justify dedications, in-lieu
fees, and more importantly, impact fees.
These statutory and constitutional provisions "enable" municipali-
ties to obtain certain exactions and impact fees from developers. In
this respect, they may be referred to as enabling constitutional provi-
sions and statutes.58
48. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
49. See, Johnston, supra note 8, at 887.
50. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 66410-66499.58 (West 1983 & Supp. 1986).
51. Id. § 66477.
52. Id. § 66475.
53. 1i § 66483.
54. 1I §§ 66478.1-66478.14.
55. Id. §§ 65970-65981.
56. CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 7.
57. CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 5.
58. The principal sources of power for local control are state statutes and constitu-
tional provisions delegating the state's power to local governments. These so-called en-
abling acts authorize local governments to regulate, and the power to impose
IV. Is THERE A VALID EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER?
State acts enabling municipalities to impose exactions and impact
fees are rarely challenged as unconstitutional exercises of the police
powers of the state. Most of the legal battles focus on the municipal
ordinances which are based on the enabling acts.59 In determining
whether a municipal ordinance is a valid exercise of police power, the
courts usually employ two requirements: (1) there must be a permis-
sible government objective behind the ordinance; and (2) the ordi-
nance must be reasonable.6 0
The first test is that the exaction or impact fee must be imposed to
achieve a valid governmental goal. This is a substantive due process
concern.6 1 The California Supreme Court has expressly held that
there is no violation of substantive due process if the regulation of
the use of real property reasonably relates to a legitimate govern-
ment purpose.62 Indeed, there is almost always a permissible objec-
tive behind a municipal ordinance which incorporates an exaction or
impact fee.63
The most common criticism of municipal ordinances is that they
are unreasonable and, thus, unconstitutional exercises of the state's
police power.6 4 Courts of the United States have approached the
question of reasonableness in several ways. Although police power
allows a city to protect the health, safety, and morals of a city,65 po-
lice power certainly is not unlimited.6 6 The courts of Illinois used
this rationale in setting forth a reasonable test. In Pioneer Trust and
Savings Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect,6 7 the Supreme Court of
Illinois placed an almost insurmountable burden on local govern-
ments seeking money payments or dedications of land for extra-de-
conditions may be either express or implied. See 2 CAL. JUR. 3D Administrative Law
§ 74 (1973).
59. See Note, supra note 8, at 555.
60. D. HAGMAN & D. MISCZYNSKI, supra note 11, at 348. See also Heyman &
Gilhool, The Constitutionality of Imposing Increased Community Costs on New Subur-
ban Residents Through Subdivision Exactions, 73 YALE L.J. 1119, 1122 (1964); Billings
Properties, Inc. v. Yellowstone County, 144 Mont. 25, 394 P.2d 182 (1964) (despite ex-
plicit enabling statute, the court still had to tackle the constitutional issue of reasona-
bleness of the exercise of police power in the particular situation).
61. See 13 CAL. JUR. 3D Constitutional Law § 364 (1974). The law must not be un-
reasonable, arbitrary, or capricious, but must have a real and substantial relation to
the object sought to be obtained. Id.
62. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. 3d 392, 409-10, 546
P.2d 687, 698-99, 128 Cal. Rptr. 183, 194-95 (1976); Hernandez v. Department of Motor
Vehicles, 30 Cal. 3d 70, 78, 634 P.2d 917, 921, 177 Cal. Rptr. 566, 570 (1981).
63. See 2 P. ROHAN, supra note 2, § 9.01[2]. "The type of exactions required of
land developers obviously furthers the public good." Id.
64. Note, supra note 8, at 561.
65. Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926); see also 13 CAL. JUR. 3D
Constitutional Law § 117 (1973).
66. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
67. 22 Ill. 2d 375, 176 N.E.2d 799 (1961).
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velopment costs.68 In that case, a land dedication was held invalid
because it was not directly related to the costs generated by the sub-
division.69 The court made a finding of fact that school facilities in
the village where the development was to be located were near ca-
pacity because of the existing size of the schools.
With these facts in mind, the court recognized that the overcrowd-
ing was not caused exclusively by the new development, and hence
the municipality could not legally exact land from the developer for
school facilities.70 The court held that the only time a developer
could be required to dedicate land or make a payment was when the
increased costs of the city were "specifically and uniquely attributa-
ble" to the new development. 71
Another strict test was set forth in New York in the case of Gulest
Associates, Inc. v. Town of Newburgh.72 The court was concerned
that there was no guarantee under present standards that exactions
obtained from the developer would be applied to the direct benefit of
the development itself. Hence, the court held that exactions were
prohibited unless it could be shown that the exactions would directly
benefit the development to which they were related.73 Subsequently,
however, the New York court in Jenad, Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale
specifically held that the ruling in Gulest was incorrect.74 The court
instead focused on the need for certain public goods created by a de-
velopment, and not on the necessity of a direct benefit flowing from
an exaction. 75
Although Gulest was overruled, Pioneer is still valid law in Illinois.
However, other states have followed a standard more relaxed than
the Pioneer ruling. The most widely-used test is the "rational nexus"
test, which requires a developer to assume costs which have a "ra-
tional nexus to the needs created by, and benefits conferred upon,
the subdivision."76 One commentator has declared that the rational
68. Juergensmeyer & Blake, supra note 19, at 427-29.
69. Pioneer, 22 I1. 2d at 381, 176 N.E.2d at 802; see also Heyman & Gilhool, supra
note 60, at 1135.
70. Pioneer, 22 Ill. 2d at 381-82, 176 N.E.2d at 802.
71. Id at 379, 176 N.E.2d at 801 (following Rosen v. Village of Downers Grove, 19
Ill. 2d 448, 167 N.E.2d 230 (1960)).
72. 25 lMisc. 2d 1004, 209 N.Y.S.2d 729 (1960), affd, 15 A.D.2d 815, 225 N.Y.S.2d 538
(1962), overruled, Jenad v. Scarsdale, 18 N.Y.2d 78, 218 N.E.2d 673, 271 N.Y.S.2d 955
(1966).
73. 25 Misc. 2d at 1007, 209 N.Y.S.2d at 732-33.
74. 18 N.Y.2d 78, 84, 218 N.E.2d 673, 676, 271 N.Y.S.2d 955, 957 (1966).
75. Id. at 84, 218 N.E.2d at 676,271 N.Y.S.2d at 958.
76. Longridge Builders, Inc. v. Planning Bd. of Princeton Township, 52 N.J. 348,
nexus test is "similar to the specifically and uniquely attributable test
[set forth in Pioneer] in its two-pronged examination of needs and
benefits,"77 but that it is different in "the degree of evidence required
to validate the police power exercise - the rational nexus test in-
creases the presumption of validity." 78 However, another commenta-
tor has claimed that the municipality's burden of establishing a
rational nexus between its exactions and the needs attributable to
the development is a "substantial one."79
In an attempt to exclude subjective review from standards used to
evaluate the reasonableness of municipal ordinances, the Utah
Supreme Court in Banberry Development Corp. v. South Jordan
City80 set forth a more objective standard. The court suggested that
to properly measure a developer's share of increased community
costs, "a municipality should determine the relative burdens previ-
ously borne and yet to be borne by those properties in comparison
with the other properties in the municipality as a whole."s1 It de-
cided that several factors could be used to judge costs borne by the
new development.82 According to at least one commentator, the
standards set forth in this case should lead to increased cooperation
between developers and city officials and therefore less litigation.8 3
California courts have developed a different approach. In 1949, the
California Supreme Court in Ayres v. City Council of Los Angeles8 4
350, 245 A.2d 336, 337 (1968). See also Brazer v. Borough of Mountainside, 55 N.J. 456,
465-66, 262 A.2d 857, 862 (1970); Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608,
137 N.W.2d 442, appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 4 (1966); Juergensmeyer & Blake, supra
note 19, at 433 (the rational nexus test "properly focuses on and balances the legiti-
mate interests of the developer and the general welfare concerns and power of the mu-
nicipality"); Pavelko, Subdivision Exactions: A Review of Judicial Standards, 25
WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 269, 287 (1983).
77. Pavelko, supra note 76, at 287.
78. Id.
79. Johnston, supra note 8, at 924.
80. 631 P.2d 899 (Utah 1981).
81. Id. at 903.
82. Id. at 904. The factors were listed as follows:
(1) the cost of existing capital facilities; (2) the manner of financing existing
capital facilities . . .; (3) the relative extent to which the newly developed
properties and the other properties in the municipality have already contrib-
uted to the cost of existing capital facilities ... ; (4) the relative extent to
which the newly developed properties and the other properties in the munici-
pality will contribute to the cost of existing capital facilities in the future; (5)
the extent to which the newly developed properties are entitled to a credit be-
cause the municipality is requiring their developers or owners ... to provide
common facilities . . .that have been provided by the municipality and fi-
nanced through general taxation or other means ... in other parts of the mu-
nicipality; (6) extraordinary costs, if any, in servicing the newly developed
properties; and (7) the time-price differential inherent in fair comparisons of
amounts paid at different times.
Id.
83. See Note, supra note 8, at 550.
84. 34 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949).
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set the stage for a reasonableness standard in the state. Plaintiff in-
tended to subdivide a thirteen acre tract, but the City of Los Angeles
imposed four conditions as prerequisites for the approval of the sub-
division. These conditions involved the dedication of land for ex-
panding a roadway and for planting trees. According to the plaintiff,
the benefit to the subdivision would be relatively small compared to
the beneficial return to the city.8 5 Hence, the plaintiff argued, the
conditions were unreasonable. Based on several principles, the court
dispensed with the reasonableness claim, emphasizing that (1) at
least some of the need for the dedications was attributable to the
plaintiff's proposed subdivision;8 6 and (2) the dedications required by
the city had economically benefited the subdivision - the fact that
the dedications would incidentally benefit the city as a whole had no
relevancy and was therefore no defense.8 7 The court placed greater
weight or the need caused by the development than on the benefit to
the development as a result of the dedication.
The Ayres decision was not limited to its particular facts and hence
it was followed by other California cases that have validated and in-
validated dedications and fees pursuant to the Ayres test.88 The sig-
nificance of Ayres, however, was that it set a foundation for the
court's decision in Associated Home Builders v. City of Walnut
Creek.8 9 In that case, plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of a
Subdivision Map Act statute which required dedication of land for
parks and recreation, and the ordinance that followed it.90
The principal contentions of the plaintiff in Associated Home
Builders -were that there was not a direct relationship between the
85. Id at 39-40, 207 P.2d at 6.
86. Id. at 38-39, 207 P.2d at 5-6.
87. Id. at 40-41, 207 P.2d at 6-7.
88. See Bringle v. Board of Supervisors, 54 Cal. 2d 86, 351 P.2d 765, 4 Cal. Rptr. 493
(1960) (California Supreme Court cited Ayres and upheld a dedication of an easement
for widening of a street because of a reasonable relationship between increased traffic
needs and the dedication); Mid-Way Cabinet Fixture Mfg. v. County of San Joaquin,
257 Cal. App. 2d 181, 65 Cal. Rptr. 37 (1967) (court of appeal held that dedication of
land for a road was improper because such dedication had no real relationship to the
needs created by the expansion of a building); Kelber v. City of Upland, 155 Cal. App.
2d 631, 318 P.2d 561 (1957) (court of appeal ruled that fees for park and school site
fund and for subdivision drainage fund were not related to the needs created by the
new subdivision).
89. 4 Cil. 3d 633, 484 P.2d 606, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630, appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 878
(1971).
90. At the time the case was before the court, the Subdivision Map Act statute in
question was found in CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 11546 (West 1964). It is now located
in CAL. GOV'T CODE § 66477 (West Supp. 1986).
new development and the increased needs of the community, and the
contribution to the city would not directly benefit the new develop-
ment. In response, the court admitted that the new development was
not the sole cause of decreasing open space and the city would also
incidentally benefit from the exaction. However, the court noted
that to accomplish the objectives mentioned by plaintiffs would be
virtually impossible. The court ruled that (1) there need not be a di-
rect relationship between a particular development and the increase
in community needs,9 1 and (2) if the land or fees exacted by the mu-
nicipality bears a reasonable relationship to the use of the facilities
by the future inhabitants of the subdivision or development, the re-
quirement is deemed valid.92 The court therefore held that the par-
ticular dedication required of plaintiff for subdivision approval was
reasonable under the circumstances.
In determining the reasonableness of the statute and ordinance in
Associated Home Builders, the court placed tremendous value on the
public interest in having open spaces in and around the municipality.
The court also looked at the individual interests of the subdivider,
but these interests did not outweigh the public interest. There
seemed to be a type of balancing test based on the facts of the case.
According to the Associated Home Builders court, only an indirect
benefit affecting the new development need be shown and increased
needs of the community only have to be reasonably related to the
new development in order for an exaction to be deemed valid. These
rulings left an open-ended test for the courts to use in determining
the reasonableness of certain dedications and fees. 93
In Liberty v. California Coastal Commission,94 the California ap-
pellate court introduced a limiting factor to the open-ended test of
Associated Home Builders. In Liberty, the plaintiff planned to de-
velop a restaurant near the beach and was required to provide free
public parking to alleviate parking problems in the area. Plaintiff
91. 4 Cal. 3d at 639-40, 484 P.2d at 611, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 635.
92. Id. at 640, 484 P.2d at 612, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 636. In this part of the holding, the
court cited sections 11546(c) and (e) of the Business and Professions Code. The court
added the following: "Whether or not such a direct connection is required by constitu-
tional considerations, section 11546 provides the nexus which concerns Associated." Id.
Consider the following analysis of a commentator: "If the benefit nexus, as that term
is used by the Associated court, is not constitutionally required for a valid exercise of
the police power, perhaps the court is presaging the possible abandonment of any ben-
efit test in the future." Note, Taking Without Compensation Through Compulsory
Dedication - New Horizons for California Land Use Law, 5 LOY. L.A.L. REV. 218,
236 (1972).
93. Under this test, few municipal ordinances have been found to be unreasonable
simply because most new developments increase needs of the community surrounding
them, and most fee and dedication payments benefit the development at least
incidentally.
94. 113 Cal. App. 3d 491, 170 Cal. Rptr. 247 (1980).
[Vol. 13: 759, 1986] California Development Fees
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
contended that the problem of parking was a need the restaurant
would not create and the benefit to plaintiff of providing such free
parking would be nonexistent. The court held the following:
Where the conditions imposed are not related to the use being made of the
property, but are imposed because the entity conceives a means of shifting the
burden of providing the cost of a public benefit to another not responsible for
or only remotely or speculatively benefiting from it, there is an unreasonable
exercise of police power.9 5
The "needs" and "benefits" tests have remained prevalent in Cali-
fornia decisions relating to exactions and impact fees. However, in
line with Associated Home Builders, the courts have placed particular
emphasis on the "needs" to which a particular development contrib-
utes. A good example of this approach is Trent Meredith, Inc. v. City
of Oxnard.96 The City of Oxnard required an exaction from plaintiff
developer as a prerequisite to the development of residential prop-
erty. In discussing the reasonableness of the exaction, the court com-
mented that the fee or dedication need only "bear a reasonable
relationship to the need for parks or school facilities generated by the
new development."97 The court also recognized that the exaction
would benefit the lot owners of the development, but did not con-
sider this benefit in its analysis.98
In applying the needs and benefits tests, courts may look to the
particular ordinance in question. In Building Industry Association of
Southern California v. City of Oxnard,99 the court of appeal invali-
dated an ordinance because it did not indicate what needs a new de-
velopment might create and what benefits a development might
recover from a fee. Plaintiff objected to a growth requirement capi-
tal fee applicable to the new development. The court recognized the
police power of the city, but went on to question the validity of the
city's exercise of that police power. The court stated that "fair-
ness"100 is the determining factor in deciding if there is a valid exer-
95. Id. at 502, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 254 (citing Mid-Way Cabinet 257 Cal. App. 2d at
191-92, 65 Cal.. Rptr. at 44).
96. 114 Cal. App. 3d 317, 170 Cal. Rptr. 685 (1981).
97. Id. at 327, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 690 (footnote omitted).
98. Id. at 328, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 691.
99. 150 Cal. App. 3d 535, 198 Cal. Rptr. 63 (1984), vacated, 40 Cal. 3d 1, 706 P.2d
285, 218 Cal. Rptr. 672 (1985).
100. "A decision is fair if it is in basic accord with the community's sense of jus-
tice." Berger, A Policy Analysis of the Taking Problem, 49 N.Y.U. L. REv. 165, 167
(1974). Fairness may be interchangeable with reasonableness in analyzing the legiti-
macy of exactions and impact fees.
cise of police power.101
The court closely scrutinized two clauses in the Oxnard ordinance.
It first questioned the 2.8% growth capital requirement fee charged
"any new development." "It is unfair to impose the same percentage
of the cost of construction of new development on all projects with-
out taking into consideration the relative impact each new project
has upon the need for additional public facilities."'102 This pointed
out the importance of calculating the need a specific development
might create. 10 3 Second, the wording relating to "general purpose
capital needs" was also troublesome because the funds could have
been applied to the benefit of the whole community.
The court concluded that the ordinance was unfair for two reasons:
(1) there was no reasonable relationship between the fee and the
needs created by the development, and (2) the fee was only for gen-
eral revenue capital needs benefiting the community as a whole
rather than for needs caused by a particular development.104
The Building Industry Association case was a rare victory for de-
velopers around the state, but it was a limited one. According to the
court, the vagueness of the ordinance was a problem. Subsequent to
the decision of the court of appeal, the California Supreme Court
granted a hearing to the City of Oxnard. However, the City of Ox-
nard changed the wording of its ordinance; the court, in a brief un-
signed opinion, stated that it would not rule on the validity of the
ordinance because it had been changed. 105
The California Court of Appeal decided Grupe v. California
Coastal Commission 106 in 1985, making uncertain the test for the va-
lidity of fees and dedications. Grupe concerned the validity of a con-
dition imposed upon the granting of a coastal development permit
issued by the California Coastal Commission. Plaintiff purchased a
lot consisting of 15,250 square feet of land in Santa Cruz next to the
ocean where he planned to build a home. The California Coastal
Commission conditioned the building permit on the dedication of be-
tween 8,000 to 10,000 square feet of land for public access to the
beach for twenty-one years. Plaintiff contended that such a require-
ment was an invalid exaction.
Apparently basing his argument on California precedent, the plain-
101. 150 Cal. App. 3d at 541, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 65 (citing Mid-Way Cabinet, 257 Cal.
App. 2d at 192, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 44).
102. 150 Cal. App. 3d at 541, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 66 (emphasis added).
103. For instance, an industrial or commercial development is not going to result in
the same needs as a residential development; commercial development will not di-
rectly cause overcrowding of schools as will the typical large residential development.
104. 150 Cal. App. 3d at 541, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 66.
105. 40 Cal. 3d 1, 706 P.2d 285, 218 Cal. Rptr. 672 (1985).
106. 166 Cal. App. 3d 148, 212 Cal. Rptr. 578 (1985).
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tiff asserted that a particular exaction is valid only if it (1) is related
to a need to which the development contributes, and (2) either di-
rectly or indirectly benefits the development. 107 The first prong of
the test was clearly met. Grupe's project, according to the court, con-
tributed to a need:
Although respondent's home alone has not created the need for access to the
tidelands fronting his property, it is one small project among a myriad of
others which together do severely limit public access to the tidelands and
beaches of this state, and therefore collectively create a need for public
access.
1 08
As for the second prong of the test, it was not clear whether the
dedication would either directly or indirectly benefit the Grupes'
planned house construction. The state maintained that there was no
requirement that the exaction either directly or indirectly benefit the
development for it to be valid. The court agreed with this argument
because the court in Associated Home Builders never firmly decided
whether there had to be a nexus between the benefit to the develop-
ment and the exaction.' 0 9 The court also noted that the benefit/
nexus question was instead answered in Sea Ranch Association v.
California Coastal Commission 110 and Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Cali-
fornia Coastal Commission,111 at least with respect to beach access
dedications. In each of these cases, the court had approved beach ac-
cess dedication conditions without requiring that any benefit be con-
ferred upon the conditioned development.112 In line with the court's
reading of Associated Home Builders, Sea Ranch, and Georgia-Pa-
cific, it concluded that there need only be an indirect relationship be-
tween a proposed exaction and a need to which the development
contributes, and that the exaction does not have to benefit the devel-
opment at all.11 3
The court in Grupe appeared to limit its holding to beach access
107. Id. at 163-64, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 587.
108. Id. at 167, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 589-90 (citing Remmenga v. California Coastal
Comm'n, 163 Cal. App. 3d 623, 630, 209 Cal. Rptr. 628, 632 (1985)).
109. 166 Cal. App. 3d at 165, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 588.
110. 527 F. Supp. 390 (N.D. Cal.), vacated, 454 U.S. 1070 (1981) (involving a chal-
lenge to public access conditions required for the approval of 32 building permits).
111. 132 Cal. App. 3d 678, 183 Cal. Rptr. 395 (1982) (public access easements re-
quired as a condition of expansion and improvement of a Georgia-Pacific industrial
facility).
112. Grupe, 166 Cal. App. 3d at 165, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 588. "The fact that the devel-
opment has no direct nexus to the condition, that the benefit to the public is greater
than to the developer, or that future needs are taken into consideration, does not de-
stroy the validity of the condition." Il (quoting Sea Ranch, 527 F. Supp. at 395) (em-
phasis omitted).
113. Grupe, 166 Cal. App. 3d at 166, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 589.
dedications. How the case will affect other fee and dedication contro-
versies is uncertain. If Grupe is applied to other situations, there will
be a new level upon which cities may step in drafting ordinances.
One major contention of plaintiffs in the past has been that the re-
quired dedications and fees do not apply to their developments, but
rather to the community at large. This contention may be entirely
wiped out by Grupe. Grupe will probably be applied only to beach
access dedication, and the California courts will most likely continue
to use the traditional needs and benefit tests in other types of fees
and dedications cases.
V. EXACTIONS AND IMPACT FEES AS REGULATIONS OR TAXATION
Dedications, in-lieu, and impact fees have generally been tagged as
regulations. It is not difficult to label dedications and in-lieu fees as
regulations in California because the legislature has provided for spe-
cific exactions in the Subdivision Map Act and School Facilities
Actl1 4 which are regulatory by nature. However, if the dedications or
in-lieu fees are beyond the enabling legislation, they are considered
taxes.
Impact fees, which reach beyond the enabling legislation, are a lit-
tle more difficult to label. Because impact fees are functionally simi-
lar to dedications and other land use planning and growth
management tools, the regulation tag seems appropriate.1 15 If con-
strued as regulations, they are usually justified by the police power in
line with constitutional provisions.
However, at times it seems that the tax label is more appropriate
for certain impact fees. It is a tough line to draw in setting the two
apart. What exactly is a tax? In its broadest sense, a tax is a compul-
sory exaction imposed by the legislature upon persons or property for
the purpose of raising revenue to fund a government endeavor.116 In
narrower contexts, the definition of the word does not include
charges to particular individuals which do not exceed the value of the
governmental benefit conferred upon or the service rendered to the
individuals.117
Another effort at a definition may be helpful. A tax probably only
includes charges imposed for the purposes of raising revenue for a
general fund. Hence, taxes can be distinguished from charges im-
114. See supra notes 12-18 and accompanying text.
115. Juergensmeyer & Blake, supra note 19, at 422.
116. See Westfield-Palos Verdes Co. v. City of Rancho Palos Verdes, 73 Cal. App. 3d
486, 495-96, 141 Cal. Rptr. 36, 42-43 (1977); Associated Home Builders at Greater East
Bay, Inc. v. City of Newark, 18 Cal. App. 3d 107, 109-11, 95 Cal. Rptr. 648, 648-50 (1971);
City of Madera v. Black, 181 Cal. 306, 310-11, 184 P. 397, 400 (1919).
117. See County of Fresno v. Malmstrom, 94 Cal. App. 3d 974, 984, 156 Cal. Rptr.
777, 783 (1979).
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posed for purposes of regulation in the exercise of the police
power.118
There are, in fact, several rationales for classifying impact fees as
taxes. One is that impact fees are a positive exaction of funds, as are
taxes. 1 9 Another is that impact fees are sometimes imposed to gen-
erate revenue for general purpose needs of a municipality, and taxes
are likewise used to generate revenue for a general fund.120
Regulations have limits as to how they may be applied. The gen-
eral rule in California is that a regulatory fee must not "exceed the
sum reasonably necessary to cover the costs of the regulatory pur-
pose sought .... ,121 Other states limit taxes as well, and where
taxes are imposed on a developer that exceed the costs generated by
a new development, constitutional problems arise. In most other
states, the rule is that cities should not be able to exact taxes from
developers which exceed the costs generated by the new develop-
ments.122 In California, on the other hand, a tax need not be related
to the benefits received (i.e., classes of businesses or activities may be
taxed and the money used for unrelated public purposes which do
not benefit those taxpayers). 123 Therefore, taxes may be used in Cal-
ifornia to collect revenue for general purposes.
If an ordinance is declared to be tax-like because of its general rev-
enue-raising purposes, then it follows that the "tax" must be author-
ized to be considered valid under California tax law. Local
governments in the past relied upon constitutional privileges under
article XI, section 7, and article XI, section 5 of the California Consti-
tution, which delegate police powers as the fundamental grant of au-
thority to tax.124 However, article XIIIA, section 4 of the California
Constitution (hereinafter "section 4") was enacted June 6, 1978, and
118. John Rapp & Son v. Kiel, 159 Cal. 702, 706-07, 115 P. 651, 653 (1911).
119. Juergensmeyer & Blake, supra note 19, at 424.
120. Consider the following argument: impact fees and exactions are not imposed
for the public health, safety, or welfare. Rather, they "are efforts by the community to
shift the financial burden of providing necessary public improvements in [and around]
new subdivisions [and other developments]. This is a tax problem, and it ought to be
treated accordingly." Note, Subdivision Exactions: Where is the Limit, 42 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 400, 404 (1967).
121. Mills v. County of Trinity, 108 Cal. App. 3d 656, 661, 166 Cal. Rptr. 674, 677
(1980) (quoting United Business Comm'n v. City of San Diego, 91 Cal. App. 3d 156, 165,
154 Cal. Rptr. 263, 269 (1979)).
122. D. HAGMAN & D. MISCZYNSKI, supra note 11, at 368.
123. See 5 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Taxation § 1 (8th ed. 1974).
124. Nauraan, Local Government Taxing Authority Under Proposition 13, 10 Sw.
U.L. REV. 795, 798-99 (1978).
provides the following: "Cities, counties and special districts, by a
two-thirds vote of the qualified electors of such district, may impose
special taxes on such district, except ad valorem taxes on real prop-
erty . . . within such City, County or special district."125
Although it can be argued that section 4 provides cities, counties,
and special districts with a new taxing authority, the framers of the
constitution really intended to restrict the imposition of certain
taxes. 126 As noted by the California Supreme Court, section 4 re-
stricts the imposition of special taxes by mandating a two-thirds voter
approval requirement. 127
If a court finds that an ordinance requiring a fee or dedication is
not a regulation, but really a tax because of the ordinance's general
revenue-raising purposes, and that the ordinance was enacted before
June 6, 1978, the ordinance will not come under section 4 scrutiny.
However, if the ordinance is found to be a tax, and it was approved
after June 6, 1978, then the limitations of section 4 apply.
Section 4 requires two-thirds voter approval of the county's quali-
fied voters for imposition of a "special tax."128 If an ordinance is de-
clared a tax, and the ordinance was enacted after June 6, 1978, the
issue becomes whether the tax is a "special tax" and therefore
whether it is subject to section 4 limitations. The Building Industry
Association129 court summarily dismissed this question by declaring
that a fee authorized by an ordinance was a tax. It assumed then,
without discussion, that the tax was a special tax under section 4:
"Our conclusion that the ordinance as written does not create a valid
regulatory fee requires a finding it is a tax. Such a tax is void be-
cause it. . .has not been approved by a two-thirds vote of the electo-
rate of the city."130
Others in the legal profession have not disposed of the issue so eas-
ily because the term "special tax" has no established or well-defined
meaning. The California Attorney General has approached the issue
several times amidst different factual circumstances. An attorney
general opinion dated May 18, 1979, held that fees imposed under
Government Code section 65974 (School Facilities Fees) constituted
125. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, § 4.
126. Nauman, supra note 124, at 802 (section 4 supplements the implied grant of
power under statutes delegating taxing authority to the municipalities). See also
Hagman, Born Again Special Assessments and the Landowner or Developer as Com-
munity Financier, 5 REAL PROP. L. REP. 89, 91 (1982).
127. Amador Valley Joint Union High School Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 22
Cal. 3d 208, 227, 583 P.2d 1281, 1288, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239, 246 (1978) ("The requirement of
section 4 that any 'special taxes' must be approved by a two-thirds vote ... restricts
but does not abolish the power of local governments in the raising of revenue.").
128. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, § 4.
129. 150 Cal. App. 3d at 541, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 66.
130. Id.
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special taxes within the meaning of article XIIIA of the California
Constitution.1 31 The opinion referred to a "tax" as a compulsory ex-
action imposed by use of legislative power upon several persons or
property to fund a government endeavor. 32 The opinion then con-
cluded that the fees in question were taxes.133 The issue then be-
came whether the fees were "special taxes." In a brief statement, the
Attorney General considered the tax a "special tax" because the
"framers would support a broad concept of 'special' taxes covering all
local taxes levied, other than property taxes, to support local
programs."i34
On November 1, 1979, the Attorney General handed down another
opinion on an issue relating to the definition of "special taxes."1 35
The question presented was whether "[a]n in-lieu fee imposed by a
county as a condition for issuing a building permit for the purpose of
providing housing for low and moderate income persons is a 'special
tax.' "136 After recognizing that taxes have more revenue-raising
characteristics than regulatory or compensatory characteristics, the
Attorney Gemeral declared that the fees in question were for the pri-
mary purpose of raising revenue and therefore were a tax.1 37 The
Attorney General went on to claim that "special taxes," as referred
to in section 4, means any new or increased exaction for revenue pur-
poses 3 8 and thus were a "special tax" within the meaning of section
4.139
California courts have been reluctant to apply a special tax label to
tax-like ordinances. In J. W. Jones Co. v. City of San Diego,1 40 the
supreme court examined the question of whether an impact fee was a
special tax under article XIIIA, section 4.141 Plaintiffs J.W. Jones
Companies and partners were developers and landowners in North
131. 62 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 254 (1979).
132. Id at 256. See supra note 116 for cases that the attorney general used in defin-
ing what constitutes a "tax."
133. 62 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. at 257.
134. Id. (citing DEPARTMENT OF STATE, STATE OF CAL., CALIFORNIA VOTERS PAM-
PHLET 58 (June 6, 1978)). See also Amador Valley, 22 Cal. 3d at 226, 583 P.2d at 1288,
149 Cal. Rptr. at 246; Nauman, supra note 124, at 824 ("It would appear ... that the
most likely ...option for the courts in defining 'special taxes' is one that embraces
'all taxes other than property taxes' ").
135. 62 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 673 (1979).
136. Id, at 673.
137. Id. at 677-79.
138. Id. at 686.
139. Id, at 687.
140. 157 CaL. App. 3d 745, 203 Cal. Rptr. 580 (1984).
141. Id at 747-48, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 582. In this case, an impact fee was under con-
University City, an area affiliated with San Diego. San Diego had
formulated a resolution imposing a facilities benefit assessment
("FBA") on undeveloped property in North University City, to be
used to improve streets and parks in that city.142
Plaintiffs claimed that the FBA fees were a special tax under sec-
tion 4, and thus void because there was not a two-thirds majority of
the electorate approving the tax. In deciding the issue, the court con-
cluded that a special assessment is a charge to real property to pay
for benefits that property has received from a local improvement, 143
and that the FBA fee was within that definition.14 4 Furthermore, the
court recognized that the special assessment was included in the
state's police power. 45 The court also recognized that a special tax as
used in section 4 does not mean "special assessment," but rather
taxes levied for a specific purpose.1 4 6 Therefore, the court concluded
that the FBA fee was a special assessment and therefore not a special
tax subject to section 4.147 Hence, voter approval of the fees in ques-
tion was not required.
sideration, and not a dedication or fee relating to a statute (i.e., a statute included
within the Subdivision Map Act).
142. Id. at 750, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 583.
143. id at 754, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 586 (citing County of Fresno v. Malmst-om, 94 Cal.
App. 3d 974, 983-84, 156 Cal. Rptr. 777, 782-83 (1979)). Once the assessment results in
revenue above the cost of the improvement or is of general public benefit, it is no
longer a special assessment - it is a tax. See also City of Los Angeles v. Offner, 55
Cal. 2d 103, 108-09, 358 P.2d 926, 929-30, 10 Cal. Rptr. 470, 473-74 (1961); Hagman, Land-
owner-Developer Provision of Communal Goods Through Benefit-Based and Harm
Avoidance "Payments" (BHAPS), 5 ZONING & PLAN. L. REP. 17, 19 (1982) (special as-
sessments are tax-like).
144. 157 Cal. App. 3d at 758, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 589.
145. Id (citing Trent Meredith, Inc., v. City of Oxnard, 114 Cal. App. 3d 317, 170
Cal. Rptr. 685 (1981) and Solvang Mun. Improvement Dist. v. Board of Supervisors, 112
Cal. App. 3d 545, 553, 169 Cal. Rptr. 391, 395-96 (1980)).
146. 157 Cal. App. 3d at 754, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 586 (citing City Council of San Jose v.
South, 146 Cal. App. 3d 320, 332, 194 Cal. Rptr. 110, 118 (1983)). See also Mills v.
County of Trinity, 108 Cal. App. 3d 656, 662, 166 Cal. Rptr. 674, 678 (1980), where the
court stated that the special tax referred to in section 4 of article XIIIA excludes "spe-
cial assessments charged for improvements to individual properties which do not ex-
ceed the benefits the assessed properties receive from the improvement." Contra
Nauman, supra note 124, at 820 (concluding that the voting public probably intended
to include special assessments within the meaning of "special tax").
147. 157 Cal. App. 3d at 758, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 589. The attorney general has also
introduced an opinion incorporating the same special assessment exception incorpo-
rated in J. W. Jones. 62 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 663 (1979). The opinion involved fees im-
posed pursuant to CAL. GOV'T CODE § 66484 (West Supp. 1986). It recognized that the
purpose of section 4 was to circumvent property tax relief. It declared, however, that
special assessments fell outside the purview of section 4. 1I. at 670. The opinion fol-
lowed a California case in noting that the basis of an imposition of a special assessment
is the benefit inuring to the property assessed. Id at 669 (citing Anaheim, Sugar Co. v.
County of Orange, 181 Cal. 212, 216, 183 P. 809, 811 (1919)). Fees under Government
Code section 66484 were determined to be special assessments because "the exaction of
section 66484 is designed to build improvements of benefit to subdivided property and
charge against that property no more than the share of costs attributable to that bene-
fit." Id. at 670.
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In Trent Meredith Inc. v. City of Oxnard,148 the court took an ex-
treme position in declaring that an exaction imposed under Govern-
ment Code section 65970 was not a "special tax" within the meaning
of section 4. In doing so, the court relied on County of Fresno v.
Malmstrom:
[A] major thrust of Article XIIIA is aimed at controlling ad valorem property
taxes.... Thus, Section 1 limits the ad valorem tax rate to a maximum of 1
percent of market value; section 2 sets the 1975-1976 tax year as a "base" for
assessed value and limits further increases to 2 percent per year; section 3 pro-
vides that the Legislature may not impose new ad valorem taxes on real prop-
erty; and section 4 provides that cities, counties and special districts may not
impose new ad valorem property taxes.
14 9
While this quote is basically a correct interpretation of article XIIIA,
it is incomplete because it does not mention any restriction on the
definition of "special taxes." However, the court in Trent Meredith
used this interpretation as if it were complete. It found that the fee
in question was not an ad valorem tax and, pursuant to the above in-
terpretation, concluded that there was no restriction in section 4
against imposing such a fee.15o
The trend. seems to be that California courts will try to avoid plac-
ing a "special tax" label on a tax-like ordinance, although the Califor-
nia Attorney General has not appeared reluctant to do so. Since case
law is stronger precedent than attorney general opinions, it will prob-
ably predominate in future cases before the court.
VI. THE PREEMPTION ARGUMENT
California has explicit statutes granting authority to local govern-
ments to obtain dedications and fees from developers. These statutes
are included within the Subdivision Map Act and the School Facili-
ties Act. However, "[t]he obvious problem with explicit statutes is
that the more precisely they define the extent of municipal power,
the less flexibility they provide communities to deal with uniquely lo-
cal situatiorLs .. .. "151 In other words, the specific statutes consti-
tute both an authority for the imposition of fees and dedications and
148. 114 Ca.. App. 3d 317, 170 Cal. Rptr. 685 (1981).
149. Id at 1224, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 689 (quoting County of Fresno, 94 Cal. App. 3d at
980-81, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 780-81).
150. 114 Cal.. App. 3d at 325, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 689. In the alternative, this court con-
cluded that the fee in question was not a tax at all because the fee was regulatory in
nature and a valid exercise of the state's police power. Id at 327-28, 170 Cal. Rptr. at
691.
151. Note, supra note 8, at 558.
a limitation on their imposition.15 2
A. Subdivision Map Act
Some years ago, the courts considered preemption arguments in-
volving the Subdivision Map Act. In the case of Kelber v. City of Up-
land,153 plaintiff sued to recover fees required by the city for its
approval of a subdivision map. The ordinance used by the city was
allegedly made pursuant to a statute in the Subdivision Map Act.
However, the fees in question were intended for the general benefit
of the city and were fees that the city was not explicitly authorized to
collect. On these facts, the court made the following declaration:
All of the references to local ordinances in the Subdivision Map Act relate
to a local ordinance as defined in the statute, and to the design and improve-
ment of subdivisions which are also defined in the statute. An intent rather
clearly appears to limit, by these definitions, the authority of such a city to
adopt local ordinances regulating subdivisions.
1 5 4
The court went on to apply this principle to the circumstances of the
case, and concluded the following: "The authority to adopt local ordi-
nances containing requirements supplementary to the Map Act is
limited by the terms of the statute .... It follows that the fees here
in question were illegally imposed and collected."155
In Santa Clara County Contractors and Homebuilders Association
v. City of Santa Clara,156 the court followed the Kelber analysis.
Plaintiffs challenged the validity of a city ordinance permitting the
collection of fees for the purpose of raising revenue for general mu-
nicipal purposes. Plaintiffs contended that the authorization to im-
pose such general revenue-raising fees was preempted by the specific
regulations of the Subdivision Map Act. The court, as in Kelber, rec-
ognized that the specific statutes had a limiting effect on other fees to
be imposed: "the imposition of the fees required by the ordinance in
our case is contrary to the terms of the Subdivision Map Act."157
152. Hagman, supra note 143, at 29 ("the existence of authority to impose specific
exactions could lead to an inference that others are not authorized").
153. 155 Cal. App. 2d 631, 318 P.2d 561 (1957).
154. Id. at 637, 318 P.2d at 565.
155. Id. at 638, 318 P.2d at 566.
156. 232 Cal. App. 2d 564, 43 Cal. Rptr. 86 (1965).
157. Id. at 575, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 93. The Santa Clara ordinance in question required
payment of a fee as a condition precedent to the approval of a final subdivision map
and issuance of a building permit. Id. at 571-72, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 90-91. The defendant
city referred to an attorney general opinion which concluded that a general revenue
fee used as a requirement before issuance of a building permit was valid. l at 577, 43
Cal. Rptr. at 94. However, the court declined to accept the attorney general opinion as
precedent because the Santa Clara ordinance involved approval of both a subdivision
map and a building permit; the fact that fees were a condition precedent to subdivision
map approval was the important factor. "[A] municipality may not use the Subdivision
Map Act for general revenue producing purposes." Id. at 578, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 94. How-
ever, the argument left open the question as to whether general revenue fees for the
condition of acceptance of a building permit would be preempted by the Subdivision
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Pines v. City of Santa Monica'5 8 shed some light on the issue of
preemption of imposing fees - but it failed to yield a complete analy-
sis. Plaintiffs, eight condominium developers, challenged a condo-
minium business license tax which was required by the City of Santa
Monica before a condominium license could be issued. This license
was a prerequisite to all necessary project approvals and permits, in-
cluding subdivision approval.159 Plaintiffs based their challenge on
the argument that conditioning subdivision approvals on payment of
a tax should be considered preempted by the Subdivision Map Act,
citing Kelbei, and Santa Clara, among other cases. 160 However, Pines
involved a tax rather than a fee, and this turned out to be an impor-
tant distinction. To begin with, the court noted that in an assortment
of contexts California courts have upheld local taxes against allega-
tions that they conflict with state regulations. 161 Moreover, "[11ocal
taxes generally do not conflict with state regulatory laws."'162 The
court went on to hold that "[t]he Map Act contains no language
granting or limiting local tax power."16 3 Hence, the city's tax could
not be considered preempted by the Subdivision Map Act.
However, since Pines did not rule on the issue of whether or not
the Subdivision Map Act preempts the imposition of regulation-like
dedications or fees as conditions of approval of a subdivision map,
Kelber and Santa Clara arguably still apply. Kelber and Santa Clara
and their progeny, however, do not apply to the extent that the cases
imply that a tax ordinance conflicts with the Subdivision Map Act
and is therefore preempted. 164
A recent opinion on the question issued by the California Attorney
General leads one to believe that a municipality may, by preemption,
Map Act and other related statutes. The question has remained open. See, e.g., Build-
ing Indus. Ass'n of So. Cal. v. City of Oxnard, 150 Cal. App. 3d 535, 198 Cal. Rptr. 63
(1984). In that case, there was a general revenue fee imposed by the city as a condition
for obtaining a building permit. The court declared that it was not necessary to rule
on whether the Subdivision Map Act preempted the imposition of the fee because it
found the fee in question invalid on other grounds.
158. 29 Cal. 3d 656, 630 P.2d 521, 175 Cal. Rptr. 336 (1981).
159. Id. at 659, 630 P.2d at 521-22, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 336-37.
160. Id. at 660, 630 P.2d at 522, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 337.
161. Id. at 661, 630 P.2d at 523, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 338.
162. Id. at 662, 630 P.2d at 524, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 339.
163. Id. at 663, 630 P.2d at 524, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 339.
164. The court in Pines made the following concluding comment: "The ordinance
here imposes a revenue tax that does not conflict with the state scheme for regulating
subdivisions. To the extent that [prior cases] imply a contrary result, they are disap-
proved." Id. at 664, 630 P.2d at 525, 175 Cal. Rtpr. at 340 (citations and footnote
omitted).
be precluded from levying a fee or dedication because of the inherent
limitations of the Subdivision Map Act.165 In that opinion, the ques-
tion arose as to whether a fee may be imposed on a subdivider for
installation of traffic signals near the development area, but not
within it, or whether it was preempted by the Subdivision Map
Act.166 The Attorney General did not find any express authorization
for the fee,167 and concluded that the Subdivision Map Act pre-
empted its imposition: "A city has no authority to require subdivid-
ers, as a condition of approving subdivision maps, to pay money into a
fund to be used to install traffic signals at major intersections within
the general area but outside the boundaries of the subdivision."168
According to this ruling, a fee or dedication may be considered pre-
empted by the Subdivision Map Act if the following facts are present:
(1) the fee or dedication is used for purposes other than specific pur-
poses outlined in the Subdivision Map Act, and (2) payment of the
fee or dedication is a prerequisite to approval of a subdivision map.
B. School Facilities Act
The question arises whether the School Facilities Act preempts lo-
cal governments from imposing school facilities fees that are not in-
cluded in the act. Government Code section 65974 provides for fees
to support temporary school facilities.169 But does the School Facili-
ties Act preempt the imposition of school impact fees for providing
permanent school structures? The California Attorney General an-
swered this question in the affirmative in 1979,170 reasoning that
since fees for permanent facilities were not included in the Act, it
was intended to limit the authority of local governments to make
such extractions.' 7 ' The Attorney General went on to conclude that
the trend under similar circumstances involving the Subdivision Map
Act proves that there is a legislative intent to restrict local control to
165. 63 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 64 (1980).
166. Id. at 64.
167. Id. at 68.
168. Id. at 64.
169. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65974(a) (West Supp. 1986) provides the following:
For the purpose of establishing an interim method of providing classroom fa-
cilities where overcrowded conditions exist . . . a city, county, or city and
county may, by ordinance, require the dedication of land, the payment of fees
in lieu thereof, or a combination of both, for classroom and related facilities
for elementary or high schools as a condition to the approval of a residential
development ....
170. 62 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 601 (1979).
171. Id. at 607. Three specific factors influenced the decision by the attorney gen-
eral. First, the attorney general concluded that the legislature intended to preempt
the exaction of developer fees for permanent school facilities. Id. at 607. Second, the
School Facilities Act was amended to exclude fees and dedications for permanent
school facilities. Third, the history surrounding the Subdivision Map Act shows a leg-
islative intent to restrict local control in the area of school facilities. Id. at 608.
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the wording of the statutes. 17 2
However, in Candid Enterprises, Inc. v. Grossmont Union High
School District,173 the Supreme Court of California refused to follow
the attorney general opinion, instead reasoning that "[t]he purpose of
the Act is -to encourage local school districts to identify, and local
governments to deal with, the effects of residential development on
school facilities. ... 174 Furthermore, "the Legislature evidently in-
tended that local governments use fees authorized by the Act as a
short-term solution - not that local governments be prohibited from
developing and implementing long-term solutions."' 75
The preemption issue revolves around the specific enabling stat-
utes of the Subdivision Map Act and the School Facilities Act. The
most creative approach that can be used by municipalities to circum-
vent the preemption problem is to authorize exactions and impact
fees under the broad provisions of the police power. Limitations are
then much harder to define.
VII. DEVELOPER LEGAL ACTION
A. Are Developers Harmed by Exactions and Impact Fees?
There is some disagreement as to who really pays for the fees and
dedications that cities require of developers. Some believe that it is
the landowner who sells the property to the developer. Others say it
is the developer who absorbs the cost. Still others conclude that costs
of the fees and dedications are passed on to the ultimate purchaser.
The most popular opinion is that the developer will pass the added
costs of fees and dedications on to new homeowners176 by adding
them to the purchase price. 77 The Construction Industry Research
Board claims that exactions and impact fees raise the cost of the av-
erage house in California by $10,000 to $20,000.178
172. 1&
173. 39 Cal. 3d 878, 705 P.2d 876, 218 Cal. Rptr. 303 (1985) (the School Facilities Act
does not have a preemptive effect on fees for permanent school facilities because the
legislature has recognized the need to permit local regulations relating to permanent
school facilitie;).
174. Id. at 889, 705 P.2d at 884, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 311.
175. Id, (emphasis in original).
176. See 2 P. ROHAN, supra note 2, § 9.02.
177. D. HA(MAN & D. MIsczYNsKI, supra note 11, at 135.
178. Telephone interview with Ben Bartalato of the Construction Industry Re-
search Board (Nov. 4, 1985). If the costs of the exactions and impact fees are indeed
shifted to the consumer, this may force low-income groups out of the housing market.
Note, supra note 8, at 555.
A leading real estate commentator believes that the result of exac-
tions and impact fees is to make the original landowner (who sells to
the developer) the one who pays,179 because: (1) the demand for
housing is elastic (buyers pay all they can, and when prices go up, de-
mand goes down); and (2) developers determine a set profit margin
- the price paid for the land will reflect the amount of the fees and
dedications.l8 0
This analysis may be faulty for several reasons. First, developers
cannot accurately gauge the costs of fees and dedications because
they are usually based on a percentage of the value of the improved
structures. If the developer cannot accurately gauge these costs, he
cannot accurately determine the price that should be paid for the
land. Second, the landowner will not sell if the price offered by the
developer is reduced by an amount equal to the costs of fees and ded-
ications. Third, the developer cannot set a fixed profit in advance be-
cause he typically sells his product at whatever the market will bear,
not at a fixed percentage above cost.
Many feel that, because Proposition 13 sharply reduced property
taxes, it is only fair that the original landowner bear the brunt of the
fees. The windfall handed to those landowners should be spread
around. There is also a general belief that landowners do nothing so-
cially useful which warrants profit from their landholdings.'B'
Because courts consistently allow developers to challenge exactions
and impact fees, there is strong evidence that developers are harmed
by their imposition. If developers were not harmed, then courts
would dismiss these cases for failure to state a cause of action. Fees
adversely affect an enterprise's profitability because they affect the
net profit.182 A crucial question for the developer then is whether it
is economically feasible to build in light of the fees and dedications
required l83 Another consideration is the additional financing the de-
veloper must arrange when exactions are required. Thus, exactions
may reduce the number of developers, decrease competition in the
housing industry, reduce the supply of new housing, and lead to in-
creases in the price of housing.184
B. Ability of the Developer to Bring Legal Action
Since developers may be harmed to a certain extent by illegal exac-
tions and impact fees, they have standing to bring action in a court of
179. Hagman, supra note 143, at 18.
180. Hagman, supra note 126, at 92. See also D. HAGMAN & D. MIscZYNsKi, supra
note 11, at 135.
181. Hagman, upra note 143, at 27.
182. Johnston, supra note 8, at 873.
183. Id. at 924. See also D. HAGMAN & D. MIsczYNsKI, supra note 11, at 135.
184. D. HAGMAN & D. MISCZYNSKI, supra note 11, at 136.
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law. If a developer believes that a fee is invalid, he may or may not
be in a position to do something about it. Whether he can take action
depends upon several factors, one of which is the cost of legal pro-
ceedings. Few developers wish to spend the money necessary to liti-
gate an issue involving a dedication or fee.l8 5 The major concern is
that the cost of litigation is expensive. 186 Thus, developers are often
forced to negotiate in situations where they would prefer to
litigate. 8 7
However, a developer may be involved in a substantial amount of
business in a city, so it may pay to contest the validity of the city's
fees. The costs of fees and dedications will probably be appreciably
more than the cost of legal proceedings. Another possibility is to
form an association of developers who do business in a particular city,
pooling funds for litigation costs.188
The question may arise, however, if such an association has stand-
ing to sue. If the association does not itself engage in building, can it
challenge an exaction or impact fee? California Code of Civil Proce-
dure section 382 provides in relevant part that when a "question is
one of a common or general interest, of many persons, or when the
parties are numerous, and it is impracticable to bring them all before
the court, one or more may sue or defend for the benefit of all." 8 9
In Santa Clara, the court ruled that an incorporated nonprofit associ-
ation had standing to sue, basing the ruling on Code of Civil Proce-
dure section 382. Even unincorporated associations may have
185. Id. at 345.
186. Id.
187. Consider this hypothetical situation: fees of $1,000 per single-family home for
school facilities are required of a developer by a city before approving a subdivision
map. The developer plans to build 200 homes - 200 homes times $1,000 for each home
amounts to a $200,000 school facilities fee. The developer firmly believes that a fair
school facilities fee would be $500 per home (for a total of $100,000, constituting a dif-
ference of $100,000). If a trial and appeal in the matter would cost $50,000, and the
maximum reduction of city fees possible through litigation is $100,000, there is a poten-
tial savings of $50,000. Now assume that the developer negotiates with the city before
litigation. If there is a potential savings of $25,000 through negotiation (as opposed to a
$50,000 savings from litigation), then the developer may wish to accept the $25,000 re-
duction and get on with the project without further delay. Note that even when a de-
veloper negotiates, he may still feel that the reduction is not enough, but he may be
forced into settling based strictly on economic considerations.
188. See D. HAGMAN, URBAN PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW
258 (1971). "Builder-subdividers are sometimes able to fight back when a city contin-
ues to exact illegal and unreasonable exactions only by cooperative action, such as by
bringing a clas; action." Id (footnote omitted).
189. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 382 (West 1973).
standing to sue.190
Another factor that a developer must take into consideration is
that legal actions are time-consuming. In initiating a legal proceed-
ing, the developer cannot afford to have a project delayed by the trial
and appeal process. Market conditions may change and it may not be
feasible to continue a project after a final decision is rendered. As a
result, developers may have to pay the exactions or impact fees under
protest and expressly reserve the right to contest the regulation.
However, municipalities may argue that in these circumstances the
developer voluntarily pays an exaction fee and thereby waives any
right to a refund. In the past, courts have ruled that fees paid under
these conditions represent fees paid under duress, and that the devel-
oper has not voluntarily given up any rights by having paid the
fees. 191
California courts have recently treated the matter quite differ-
ently. Consider the decision in Pfeiffer v. City of La Mesa:192 "It is
fundamental that a landowner who accepts a building permit and
complies with its conditions waives the right to assert the invalidity
of the conditions and sue the issuing public entity for the costs of
complying with them."'193 The rationale for this ruling is that the
city or county needs certainty in its affairs, and once a developer has
contributed money or land, he should not be permitted to sue for a
refund or cancellation.194
One court, however, carved out an exception in McLain Western
No. 1 v. County of San Diego,195 which involved a project where per-
mits were obtained in phases as building progressed. The court
stated:
Where new law imposes a fee condition on one of the subsequent permits [af-
ter development has begun] under circumstances where even the time neces-
sary to challenge the legality of the fee by petition for mandamus is
economically impractical, there is in reality no opportunity for an election
... .Under such limited circumstances the developer should not be required
to adhere to the general rule [stated in Pfeiffer] .... 196
190. 6 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Corporations § 37 (8th ed. 1974).
Any unincorporated association, whether organized for profit or not, may sue and be
sued in its own name. Id
191. See 2 P. ROHAN, supra note 2, § 9.01[1] n.14; Ellickson, Suburban Growth Con-
trols: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 385, 479 n.284 (1977).
192. 69 Cal. App. 3d 74, 137 Cal. Rptr. 804 (1977).
193. Id. at 78, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 806. Because this case only dealt with fees relating
to a building permit, it can be argued that the rule in the case should not apply to
other permit situations. However, this argument probably will not prevail because the
case of Air Quality Products, Inc. v. State, 96 Cal. App. 3d 340, 352, 157 Cal. Rptr. 791,
797 (1979) extended Pfeiffer to cover all "administrative actions."
194. 69 Cal. App. 3d at 78, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 806. See also McClain Western No. 1 v.
County of San Diego, 146 Cal. App. 3d 772, 776-77, 194 Cal. Rptr. 594, 596 (1983).
195. 146 Cal. App. 3d 772, 194 Cal. Rptr. 594 (1983).
196. Id. at 777, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 596.
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If a developer can afford to pay legal costs and delay development,
it may be economically feasible to institute legal proceedings.1 97 If he
can base a challenge of an exaction or impact fee on constitutional
grounds, he may also potentially bring the action under sections
1983198 and 1988199 of the United States Code, title 42. These sections
allow proceedings to redress anyone harmed by unconstitutional ac-
tivity. A recent United States District Court decision held that a tak-
ing claim resulting from land use regulations could be maintained
under section 1983.200
The real benefit in stating a cause of action under section 1983 is
the expanded availability of damages in comparison to inverse con-
demnation. cases. A property owner may recover for the value of the
land taken and any "consequential loss" caused by the taking.201
One final consideration is necessary. Where developers have been
allowed to sue for refunds and actually obtained refunds after litiga-
tion, some courts outside of California require the developers to
share their refunds with the ultimate buyers to the extent that the
illegal portions of the exactions were passed on to the consumers.20 2
However, California courts have not yet ruled on this issue.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We see that California courts have tended to hold that most exac-
tions and impact fees are reasonable because new developments cre-
ate added community needs. Moreover, these new developments
197. Most litigation in this area has involved large subdividers. However, nonsubdi-
viders are now becoming more involved in this type of case. 2 P. ROHAN, supra note 2,
§ 9.01[1].
198. Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immuni-
ties secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
199. Section 1988 provides in part: "In any action or proceeding to enforce a provi-
sion of ... [section] 1983 . .. of this title, . . . the court, in its discretion, may allow
the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part
of the costs." 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982).
200. Jacobson v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 474 F. Supp. 901 (D. Nev. 1979).
201. Comment, The Availability of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in Challenges of Land Use
Planning Regrulations: A Developer's Dream Come True? 1982 UTAH L. REV. 571, 585.
202. See, e.g., Colonial Oaks West, Inc. v. Township of E. Brunswick, 61 N.J. 560,
574-75, 296 A.2d 653, 660 (1972); S.S. & 0. Corp. v. Township of Bernards Sewerage
Auth., 62 N.J. 369, 385-86, 301 A.2d 738, 747 (1973).
benefit from the increased facilities and services made possible by ex-
actions and impact fees.
Courts have been subjective in their analyses of the reasonableness
of exactions and impact fees, avoiding discussion on specific constitu-
tional principles. They rely instead on the argument that exactions
and impact fees are regulations enforceable by the police power of
the community. Even where an exaction is tax-like, the courts have
been reluctant to give it a "special tax" label. Hence, no article
XIIIA limitations are imposed. Preemption arguments have also lost
some force since the Pines decision.
New home prices are reaching an average of $140,000 in California,
partially due to exactions and impact fees, most of which the develop-
ers pass on to consumers. Because consumers could eventually be
priced out of the housing market if developers continually pay higher
development fees, courts will probably be more sympathetic with the
developers' position in the future.
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